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THE PRISON LABOR PROBLEM:

1875-1900

BLAKE McKELVEY'

The present uncertainty as to the effect of recent legislation on
prison industries recalls the time when labor legislation first effectively invaded the field of prisons. This problem has been agitated
from the first years of the Auburn system-a full century of conflict-but it was not until the late seventies that it emerged as a
dominant factor in shaping prison developments. In prison history
the decade following the Civil War had seen a great surge of prison
reform: state boards for prison inspection, national and international
prison associations, more than a dozen new prisons, and the first adult
reformatories had all been established during those years. However,
the forces activating these developments had considerably slackened
in the mid-seventies. Except for Brockway, most of the strong personalities had dropped from the ranks, and the national association
had discontinued its sessions. The housing problem, which had been
constructively met by the progressive states, continued to vex keepers
and legislators there, and more so elsewhere, but it surrendered first
place to the labor problem.
The Dilemma of Prison Industry
The industrial revolution was already at full tilt in America.
Two of its phases in particular exerted a large influence on prison
developments: the substitution of machine industry for handicraft
production, and the organization of the labor forces. Both of these
had been in process for some time, and already the former had transformed prison industry and given it into the hands of contractors.
Many of the prisons had become prosperous factories, at least from
the point of view of the contractors, until the depression of 1873
destroyed their markets. Many of the reformers, who, a few years
before, had bitterly attacked 2 the subversive influences of the contractors, now elaborately defended the system as better than idle
prisons. The public, for its part, hesitated to trust the transient
'Ph.D., Harvard University, 1933; Social Science Research Staff, U. of
Chicago, 1934-5.
2Special Commission of State of Connecticut on Convict Labor, Report
(1880), pp. 38-44. Summary of early investigations.
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politicians in charge of the prisons with the management of large
industries.
The question might have been tabled in this fashion naci it not
been for the constant growth of organized labor during a period of
sharp political rivalry. It was one thing for the National Labor
Party to insert an anti-contract clause in its platform, and for the
Knights of Labor as well as the Federation of Organized Trades and
Labor Unions to follow this lead ;3 but it was quite another thing
when the district assemblies of the Knights and. the State Federations
took up the agitation. State politicians had their ears to the ground
in the early eighties, and they revealed some abiliy at realpolitik if
not at penological statecraft.4
The industrialization of America was taking place chiefly in that
belt of nine states reaching from Massachusetts to Illinois. Beginning with New York in,1864, all but two of these had state federations of labor by 1889, and Pennsylvania and Ohio, the two exceptions, were centers of the growing Knights of Labor with its energetic local and district assemblies.5 All except Indiana had, before
1887, set one or more special commissions to the investigation of
prison labor, and as for the Hoosier state it remained until the nineties
not only the most backward in prison reform but *the least advanced
industrially of the group. This old subterfuge, commissions for investigation, did not suffice. The parties in power in Illinois and New
Jersey hearkened to this demand of the labor forces; while in the
early eighties the Democrats, with the aid of many labor votes salvaged from the Greenback-Labor party, turned out the Republicans
in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio. The anticontract agitation had been a prominent issue and the victors did not
forget their pledges on this matter at least. The same party, capturing the White House, was able by 1887 to pass a law forbidding
sPowderley, T. V., Thirty Years of Labor (Columbus, Ohio, 1890), p. 245;

Carroll, Mollie R., Labor and Politics (Cambridge, 1923), pp. 114-17; Fed. of
Organized Trades and Labor Unions, Convention Proceedings (1881) p. 3:
"(Resolved) . . . that convict or prison labor as applied to the contract system
in several of the States is a species of slaveD in its worst form; that it pauperizes labor, demoralizes the honest manufacturer, and degrades the very
prisoner whom it employs."
4Powderley, op. cit., pp. 303-15.
aStanley, E., History of the Illinois State Federation of Labor (Chicago,
1913), pp. 561-66. New Jersey in 1879, Massachusetts in 1879-82, Illinois 1884,
Indiana 1885, Connecticut 1887, Michigan 1889. Another fine illustration of the
readiness of the politicians to throw a sop to labor was the rapid creation of
the Bureaus of Labor Statistics; led off by Massachusetts in 1869, nineteen
states established such bodies by 1887. Agitation for the federal bureau began
in 1878 and succeeded in 1884. These bureaus were active in studying, among
other problems, the prison labor problem.
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the contracting of any federal criminals in any prison where they
were housed.,
This legislative onslaught was shaking the foundations of the
o14 American prison system of Lewis Dwight. In desperation the
wardens and responsible reformers revived their national association
and convened annual congresses where they could share their fears
and debate possible solutions. They were all agreed that the prisons
could not be administered properly without labor to fill the long hours
of the convict's day. Many of them readily concluded that the labor
leaders and politicians who would interfere with this were acting
from evil motives; Franklin Sanborn, Fred Wines, and Francis Wayland denounced their opponents in impassioned speeches as selfish,
7
even communistic.
In the midst of this hubbub Zebulon Brockway proposed his
piece-price scheme, proclaiming it as the long sought-for solution.
Indeed from the point of view of the warden it had great advantages.
It proposed to eliminate the disturbing influence of the contractor
within prison walls by giving the officers full control over discipline
of the convicts and management of the industries. On the other
hand, it proposed that the warden contract with outside companies to
supply machinery and thus free himself from the necessity of waiting
on state appropriations. The scheme would make possible as large
a diversification of industry as the warden saw fit or his managing
ability allowed; further than this, it avoided the ill repute of the
contract system and secured a rich market for the products. 8
The new proposal received a varied reception. Many of the
leaders hailed from states where the current of opinion disregarded
labor protests, and they were naturally little inclined to encourage
even a compromise of the existing system; thus Profesor Wayland
from Connecticut and various leaders from Michigan were constant
critics of the proposed plan. Michael Cassidy joined in this attack
but from entirely opposite premises; his Philadelphia prison was still
operating on the old solitary system, supplying handicraft labor, un6U. S. Commission of Labor, Report (1886), p. 368. In part 2 of this
report all of the laws of the states on convict labor are quoted in full; see
pp. 507-604. Commons and Associates, History of Labor in U. S. " (Revised
edition, N. Y., 1926), II, 439 ff. U. S. Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 5,
July, 1896, pp. 471-78, abstract of laws since 1885 including U. S. law. The
Democrats cooperated with the labor forces in all of these states. Even in
Illinois, where their combined forces just failed to secure control, strikes and
boycotts brought the manufacturers to their aid, and an anti-contract amendment to the state constitution was easily carried. See Beckner, E. R., History
of Labor Legislation in Illinois (Chicago, 1929), pp. 133-44.
7National Prison Association, Proceedings (1883), pp. 2545.
8N. P. A., Proceedings (1883), pp. 61-63.
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affected in the least by either the necessity for self-support, the
machine age, or the labor unions. 9 On the other hand, leaders from
Ohio, New Jersey, and Illinois were immediately attracted by Brockway's scheme, and politicians were plentiful who, after satisfying
labor with laws against contractors, agreed to save the public taxes
by permitting the prisons to earn a part of their expenses at pieceprice agreements. In fact, of the states that abolished contracts, all
but Pennsylvania very quickly reorganized their prison industries on
this new plan.10
The prisons weathered the severest phase of the storm of labor
agitation before the end of the eighties. The growing disharmony
within labor ranks, the return of the Republicans to power, and the
discovery of the magnitude of the bills of idle prisons brought a lull
in anti-contract agitation. At the same time the weight of the reports
of numerous special investigations and of the several state Labor
Commissioners and finally in 1886 of the United States Labor Commissioner was all on the side of cautious, moderate regulation rather
than complete abolition of contracts." Most of these minimized the
importance of prison labor as a competitor of the free worker. Carroll
D. Wright, the United States Commissioner, made a special study
of the quantity and value of products displaced and concluded that
9N. P. A., Proceedings (1884), pp. 204-25, reports the free-for-all discussion in which most of the leaders took sides.
loThis reorganization was not always by act of the legislature:
New Jersey legislature passed an earlier act adopting the piece-price system
only two months after an earlier act had abolished the contracts. Barnes, H.
E., A History of the Penal, Reformatory, and Correctional Institutions of the
State of New Jersey (Trenton, 1917), pp. 145-48.
New York adopted the piece-price system in an act of 1886. N. Y. Supt.
Prisons, Report (1886), pp. 7-21.
Massachusetts adopted its piece-price law in 1888, just one year after its
anti-contract law. Pettigrove, F. G,. Prisons of Massachusetts (Boston, 1904),
pp. 12-13.
The managers of the Ohio prison assumed the authority to introduce the
new method almost immediately and this was not indorsed by the legislature
for several years. Board Directors of the Ohio Penitentiary, Report (1884), pp.
471-78.
Illinois failed to formulate a new system to replace the one abolished
and the officers renewed the old contracts as piece-price agreements. Com. of
Illinois State Penitentiary, Report (1890), p. 6.
Maryland likewise turned to the new system without any legislative direction, and solely on the belief of its new warden, J. F. Weyler, that this was
the best system for profits. Md. Penitentiary Penal Commission, Report (1913).
"The friction between the Knights and the reorganized A. F. of L. united
with the set-back occasioned by the Haymarket riots and the failure of the
eight-hour campaigns to decrease the influence of labor in politics. The attempt to run regular labor candidates in a few of the states may have had
something to do with the return of the Republicans to power. For a full
review of the reports of the several investigations, see U. S. Com. Labor,
"Convict Labor", Report (1886), pp. 307-68; and Wright, C. D., Hand Labor
in Prisons (1887).
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$28,753,999, the total product of 45,277 convicts in 1885, was a very
small figure when compared with $5,369,579,191 produced by 2,732,595 free laborers five years before. 12 This rapidly became a major
argument and was not seriously challenged until the end of the
century.
It was asserted with conviction by General Brinkerhoff
before the national conference of charity in 1887; John S. Perry, a
contractor in New York prisons, accepted it as a vindication of his
long and energetic public defense of prison industry. 8
But the labor forces were not the only interests that had to be
pacified. It has been seriously questioned whether the agitation from
the beginning was not simply a cleverly devised campaign on the
part of the industrial competitors of the contractors to destroy the
latter's advantages.' 4 At all events the labor attack had no sooner
been checked than the manufacturers rallied to the cause and formed
their National Anti-Convict Contract Association.
Presidents of
wagon factories, shoe, furniture, and stove companies, chiefly from
Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, and Missouri-all at the time lacking
anti-contract laws-gathered in Chicago in 1886 to hold their convention. Here they frankly unveiled their interest in eliminating the
unfair competition of their rivals; they voted to send their president,
Colonel W. T. Lewis, on a lecture tour to urge their cause.15
Several schemes were proposed in these years that were designed
chiefly to curb prison competition. One that made considerable headway was the requirement that all products be stamped "prison
made."'" Another proposal revealed a curious assortment of motives;
it suggested that prisoners should be employed exclusively at labor
with hand tools and man power machinery. Carroll D. Wright was
especially active in agitating this solution which he considered to be
the secret of the success of the Cherry Hill penitentiary. At his
prompting, Massachusetts adopted a modified form of the plan by
S. Com. of Labor, op. cit. (1886), p. 295, and tables on pp. 192-99.
'sNational Conference Char. and Corr., Proceedings (1887), pp. 106-12;
(1884), pp. 53-56.
"4Klein, P., PrisonMethods in N. Y. State (N. Y., 1920), p. 296: "As the
form of production developed more into the modern factory system . . . the
manufacturer was the one who felt the competition of prison labor rather than
the individual working man. The opposition to prison labor proceeded, therefore, first from free labor but continued long after the interests of the individual artisan had become secondary. When manufacturers took up the fight
they presented their own case in terms of free labor, thus obtaining the support 5of workingmen and the benefit of a more altruistic light."
1 National Anti-Convict Contract Assn., Proceedings of Chicago Convention (ed. by L. D. Mansfield, Chicago, 1886).
16U.S. Com. of Labor, op. cit. (1886), pp. 386-87; Pa. Penal Commission,
Employment and Compensation of Prisoners in Pennsylvania (1915), pp. 59-63.
Pennsylvania adopted such a law in 1883.
12U.
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forbidding the purchase of new machinery after 1887, and this remained a thorn in the side of her prison administrators for many
years..7 New York tried the idea for one fatal year in 1888; prohibiting all manufacture by motive power, she succeeded in disjointing
her entire prison system until a new law righted it. Heedless of this
lesson, Pennsylvania politicians sold their state's penological birthright for labor votes in 1897 by adopting an extreme form of this
scheme.' 8 This reactionary policy combined the desire to retard
prison production with the more general wish to check the speed of
mechanization in America; it revived the old notion that the prisoner
might thus learn a useful trade. But, if Americans had not yet fully
accepted the gospel of large scale production, it was hard on the
prisons selected to experiment with Gandhi's theory.""
Another proposal designed to limit the competitive range of
prison industries urged the prohibition of inter-state traffic in such
goods. The O'Neill Bill aiming at this end was introduced and
almost carried through Congress in 1888. The wardens who gathered
that year in Boston were greatly disturbed over the prospect; they
passed a resolution recommending a special convention of prison
officers and state legislators to determine a just solution of the difficult problem. But this revolutionary scheme for national planning
was not tested until the Richmond Convention met in 1930 to face
the modern crisis. The decline of the labor influence in the late
eighties and the disappearance of the anti-contract association, together with the defeat of the Democrats and other factors, sufficed
to stave off immediate legislation. Nevertheless, the bill remained
for many years a constant threat of an evil day ahead. 20
Contending Interests in the States
While the fury of the storm of labor legislation relented somewhat in most of the states toward the close of the decade, in New
York it continued unabated. Situated at the center of much of
labor's political agitation, this state experienced from the first the
full gamut of forces playing around the problem. It devised the
legislation that formed the basis for much of the discussion and
practice of its neighbors in succeeding years.
The acute nature of the problem in the Empire State was due
"IA'ass. Supt. Prisons, Report (1890), p. 45.
28N. Y. Supt. Prisons, Report (1889), p. 16; Pa. Penal Commission, Employment of Prisoners (1915), pp. 59-63.
'9Ohio Bulletin Char. and Corr. (Sept., 1902), p. 25.
20N. P. A., Proceedings (1888), pp. 50 ff.
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in part to its industrial environment. But the remarkable efficiency
of prison industries after the creation of the all-powerful superintendent in 1877 aggravated the situation. Lewis Pilsbury's success
in cutting prison costs to one-fifth of their earlier average entailed
the development of extensive industries, and many competitors began
to protest. 2 ' Governor Alonzo B. Cornell expressed this growing
hostility in his message of 1880; the following year the legislature
22
sent a committee to investigate industrial conditions at Sing Sing.
As its report favored the contract system, the legislature hesitated
to meddle with the ticklish problem, and referred it to the people.
Amidst a confusion of issues the contract system was condemned by
a small majority. The Republican legislature, however, refused to
act. Nevertheless that astute politician, David B. Hill, who succeeded
Cleveland as Governor, attacked the problem with energy; insisting
that the popular will be granted and that "unnecessary interference
with outside industrial interests" be eliminated.23 The constitution
prohibited new contracts but it failed to provide an alternative system. Fortunately for the prisons, as well as for the state treasury,
most of the contracts extended ahead several years, but gradually, as
they expired, the situation became critical. Two years passed before
the legislature created the Prison Labor Reform Commission to plan
a new system and, in the meantime, authorized temporary piece-price
agreements. These measures came none too soon, for unemployment
at Auburn was desperate, and Brockway at Elmira was almost at his
wit's end. 24 The Commission made a careful study and concluded
that the piece-price system was highly admirable, but, as popular
opposition must be met, a special effort to diversify the industry
would be necessary, and arrangements should be made for sale to
public and charitable institutions.2 1 This last suggestion was an early
expression of the idea that later developed into the public-use system,
but at the time it appeared as an effort to dodge the issue. Disregard21Klein, N. Y. Prisons, pp. 336-68; N. Y. Supt. Prisons, Report (1879).
The cost was reduced from $317,000 in 1876 to $67,800 in 1878.
-N. Y. Governors' Messages (ed. by C. Z. Lincoln, Albany, 1909), VII,
424-25: "The state prison has been nearly self-supporting the past year . . .
it has been accomplished at some detriment to certain mechanical interests . . .
Many intelligent and industrious mechanics represent that great hardship proceeds from this cause. While it is desirable that prisons should be as little
burdensome as possible, care should be taken to avoid all unnecessary interference with industrial interests." N. Y. Assembly Documents (1882), No.
120, pp. 1-5.
28N. Y. Governors' Messages, VIII, 12, 165; Political and Governmental
History of N. Y. (Syracuse, 1922), III, 322.
24N. Y. Supt. of Prisons, Report (1886), pp. 7-21.
25N. Y. Senate Documents (1887), No. 36, p. 13.

THE PRISON LABOR PROBLEM

ing this moderate advice, the legislature adopted the Yates Law prohibiting contracts of any kind and abolishing all manufacture that
used motive power machinery. Only production by hand labor was
allowed, and then only for the use of state institutions. 28 Immediately
the recent surplusses were exchanged for enormous deficits, and the
superintendent protested against this destruction not only of the industries but of the whole prison discipline. 27 Only in Elmira was it
made an occasion for constructive measures.
The state finally became aware that the problem was not a simple matter to be left in the hands of greedy interests. Professor
Charles V. Collins of Cornell, formerly associated with Brockway at
Elmira, drafted the bill which was introduced by Fassett in 1889 to
become the high water mark of prison labor legislation of the century.28 The new law sanctioned both the piece-price and state account systems, but provided that no industry should employ more
than five per cent of the number working at that occupation in the
state; a few industries were further restricted to 100 laborers and
required to produce for state use only. Of larger significance, the
law definitely abandoned the idea that industry should be organized
primarily for self-support and accepted the reformatory motive. The
convicts were to be divided into three classes: those with good prospects of reformation were to be instructed in trade schools and employed at these trades with no idea of state profit; the repeaters who
were at least good prisoners and possibly reformable were to be
assigned to industries at which they could find a living after discharge and in the meantime earn their keep; the desperate criminals
were to be rewarded with all the drudgery and menial labor rather
than the choice jobs which their long terms and professional standing
had formerly secured them. When in addition a wage not to exceed
one-tenth of the earnings was to be provided for meritorious prisoners, New York had indeed adopted a law worthy of a great state. "9
Unfortunately the state and its officers were poorly prepared to
administer so good a law. Neither the abilities of the officers nor
the structural equipment of the prisons permitted the genuine classi.
fication called for. Meanwhile many industries lobbied for the favored
protection granted to shoes and stove hollow-ware at which only 100
26N. Y. Supt. of Prisons, Report (1888), p. 16.

27Ibid. (1889), p. 5: "(the law of 1888) produced an unprecedented death
rate, and unequalled numerical lapses of convicts into insanity" and a deficit
of $369,274, which was larger than the total deficit of ten previous years.
2Papers in Penology (Elmira, 1891), edited by the Editor of The Summary, Eugene Smith. "The Fassett Law," pp. 85 ff.
29Ibid., pp. 93-108; N. Y. Supt. of Prisons, Report (1889), p. 16.
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prisoners could be employed. Impatient with the persistence of the
problem, and possibly stimulated by the rigors of the depression of
1893, the Constitutional Convention of 1894 advanced an amendment
which was shortly adopted fixing 1897 for the end of all iorms of
contract labor. A Prison Commission was created to organize a new
system on the state-use principle, already partially applied, and its
jurisdiction was extended over the county penitentiaries which had
so long escaped state interference. A law of 1896 carried out these
constitutional provisions and required the several state departments
to purchase from the prisons as long as their needs could adequately
be supplied."
The Empire State thus finally evolved a system with great possibilities. It excluded the prisons from the haggling of the market
place but opened a rich, if unexplored, field for their enterprise. Yet
it was no fool-proof device, and, in succeeding years, while the state
prisons were able to carry on, for the time at least, fairly satisfactory
industrial programs, the county penitentiaries, with their former industrial efficiency blasted and with no law giving them a preemptiorr
on any market, fell back into the class of mammoth city jails, condemning their inmates to noxious idleness. In fact when the New
York Prison Association made a comprehensive survey in 1900 it
found a discouraging industrial lassitude, incompatible with any purpose of reformation, permeating the entire prison system of the state;
and only the adult reformatories were avoiding its vicious results by
other devices."1
New York's pioneer legislation had been observed with interest
by her neighbors, but only Massachusetts was ready to profit from it.
The developments in the Bay State were less complex in their political
aspects but hardly less so as far as the prisons were concerned. After
repeated reverses the anti-contract forces finally secured a law in 1887
creating a Superintendent of Prisons to administer the industries at
state account. Unfortunately, by failing to provide the necessary
credit, and by prohibiting the acquisition of new machinery, it prevented any efficient reorganization, and at the same time, by banning
the contractors, it wiped out their over-time payments which had
been such an important incentive to efficient labor in the old days.
Several of these mistakes were corrected in the following year as a
soN. Y. Supt. of Prisons, Report (1896), pp. 22-24; Klein, op. cit., pp. 263-66.
"IN. Y. P. A., "Report of Special Investigation Commission", N. Y. Senate
Doc. (1900), No. 32, pp. 53-57. Onondaga County Penitentiary made efforts to
employ its prisoners at road building and stone quarrying, but this was the
only encouraging policy discovered.
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new law permitted each prison to make piece-price agreements, but
this in turn undermined the authority of the superintendent and made
central management difficult. The disheartening unemployment was
gradually eliminated, but repeated recommendations for a wage system to revive the interest of the convicts in their labor roused no
3 2

response.

After several more or less unsatisfactory years with this. system
the General Court was again persuaded to follow the example of
New York. All contracts were abolished in 1897, and a state-use
system was organized by the superintendent, now given larger powers.
An efficient administration was begun and, while Massachusetts never
adopted an elaborate system of labor classification, her prison equipment was such that she achieved its object more nearly than did New
York. The three year minimum for state prison commitment generally excluded all but the hardened convicts from Charlestown; the
likely candidates for reformation were sent to Concord, and, when
the existing piece-price agreements expired, they were given trade
instruction; the county houses of correction took care of the remainder and provided fair labor conditions. At the close of the
century the authorities were looking ahead to large developments of
outdoor labor, and while Pettigrove's proposal, that prison labor be
used to build a canal across Cape Cod, was not followed, the companion proposal that a state camp for inebriates be opened on a
large trace of waste land was carried into effect in 1902.33
When in 1883 the Democrats captured the Republican stronghold in Pennsylvania they hastened to reward their labor allies with
an anti-contract law. In this state where the district assemblies of
the Knights were so strong, no politician could propose to dodge the
law by piece-price agreements, but, as the Eastern penitentiary had
long depended on handicraft industry at" state account and as the
Western prison had long term contracts, the effect was not immediately disastrous. A complex system of wage payments was instituted to make the best of the existing industry, and the Democrats,
again in power in 1891, demonstrated their liberalism by enacting an
eight-hour limit for the convict laborer. Two parties could play this
game, and in 1897 some Republicans paid for their mess of pottage
by pushing through the devastating Muehlbronner Act abolishing the
32Pettigrove, Prisons of Mlassachusetts, pp. 12-13; Mass.-Supt. of Prisons,

Report (1890), p. 45; Mass. Prison Com., Report (1886), p. 21; also later ones.

a3Mass. Pris. Com., Report (1898), pp. 115-17; also (1903), passim.; Mass.
Supt. of Prisons, Report of . . . on Various Methods of Employing Prisoners

(1898), pp. 8-50.
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use of power machinery in the manufacture of goods produced elsewhere in the state and seriously limiting the number of men employed
at any one industry in each prison. This crippled the industry in the
Eastern as well as the Western penitentiary and only the reformatory,
already turning to trade schools and farming, escaped serious injury.
The act made a farce of prison labor in Pennsylvania for the next
thirty years and did more than any other factor to degrade the two
great penitentiaries of the Keystone State from the first rank of
American prisons.3 '
The other states did not find it necessary to follow these leaders
until the beginning of the next century. New Jersey, Ohio, and
Illinois had all abolished contracts in the early eighties, but the administrative authorities had almost immediately turned to the pieceprice compromise and were able to continue their fairly prosperous
industries. In Illinois it was not until the radical Democrat, John
T. Altgeld, became governor that conscientious effort was made to
put into effect the intent of the amendment of 1886. State account
industries were introduced, and by the end of his term over half of
the prisoners were laboring at these. Nevertheless his Republican
successor reversed the policy, charged the enormous outlays for machinery to Democratic graft and returned to piece-price agreements.33
Gradually the labor forces regained their influence, both here and in
Ohio, and with the aid of outside merchants they were able, in the
early years of the next century, to exclude prison products from the
open market. 6 Indiana, in part due to the inefficiency of her prison
industries, escaped the labor attack of the eighties. Accordingly in
1888, when for the first time her prisons reported self-support, it was
an occasion for public congratulation, and it was not until the last
year of the century that a law was finally passed calling for the
gradual abolition of contracts.3?
That Michigan, rapidly becoming industrialized, escaped the fury
of labor legislation was partially a result of the fact that her major
34
Barnes, Pennsylvania Prisons, pp. 249-53. A full account but fails to correlate it with labor politics. Some industries limited to 5% of convicts, others
to 10%; none could employ any more than 20%. This applied to each prison
so that no specialization was possible.
85Bogart, E. L., and Thomson, The Industrial State, (Springfield, Ill., 1920),
pp. 183-87; Ill. State Penitentiary Commission, Report (1900), pp. 7-10.
360hio Bulletin Char. and Corr. (1902), pp. 15-25; Becknar, Labor Legislation in Illinois, pp. 140-44, shows that the New York example played an
important part in spite of an investigation that brought back a very hostile
report of its practice.
37Indiana State Pris. So., Report (1888), p. 10; Indiana State Prison,
Report (1900), p. 5.
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prisons were already operating largely on public account."
The
Detroit House of Correction continued to pay its full expenses under
Superintendent Nickolson, but as in the days of Brockway it operated
all of its industries without any outside interference. Meanwhile
Jackson prison was extending its mining activities into additional
state owned coal lands and experimenting with hog raising and trucking on its sixty-five acre lot. When in the nineties an attack was
again made on the contractors, Warden Otis Fuller was able to
report to the National Prison Congress that he hakd successfully
defended the industries of Ionia against the assault of outside companies, making no mention of labor unions. 9
The anti-contract agitation did not affect the labor of prisohers
in all parts of the country, and yet it had some surprising reverberations. In the South the tendency to restrict and even to abolish the
lease system and to substitute farming and road labor was coincident
but entirely independent of the Northern agitation; yet there were
serious labor troubles in Kentucky and especially in Tennessee over

prison labor, and in the latter violent outbreaks persuaded the state
to terminate its coal lease in the early nineties.40 Meanwhile in the
West the anti-contract law of the federal government, prohibiting
such employment for federal convicts, practically eliminated industry
from the territorial prisons. When new states were formed here this

provision was usually embedded in their constitutions, 'and indeed
not a prison in the Rocky Mountain area provided any organized
labor for its inmates, aside from a little stone quarrying, until the
development of the honor road camps in the present century.

Labor problems however were rife in three Western prisons. The
lease of Nebraska's prison in 1877 was bitterly assailed until replaced
by contracts in the nineties. Oregon, on the other hand, abandoned
state-account industries and in 1895 leased its penitentiary. California's earlier action prohibiting new contracts after 1882 was more
to be expected in view of its active labor forces, and it affords a
clear example of the speed with which an organized force can get
results in a young state. This wide-spreading activity of the anticontract agitation suggested the expanding horizon of the North38N. P. A., Proceedings (1885), pp. 217-18. Michigan did not fully escape
the agitation but the Republican governor vetoed the act of 1884, passed by the
Democrats and labor sympathizers.
39Michigan State Prison, Report (1880), pp. 10-14; N. P. A., Proceedings
(1897), pp. 32-34.
40
Moore, J. T., Tennessee the Volunteer State (Chicago, 1923), I:276.
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eastern prison system, but it was not until the next century that the
41
development became significant.
A few protests occurred in such border states as West Virginia,
Missouri, and Kansas, but on the whole their prisons as they developed profitable industries were praised rather than criticized. In
fact practically everybody rejoiced in Missouri and Kansas when
their respective prisons began in the early eighties to operate near-by
coal mines, thus gradually becoming sources of profit to their states.
Protests that arose were brushed aside by the authorities. Similarly
in West Virginia the governor pointed out that if labor should insist
that the profitable contracts at the prison be abandoned, the alternative would be either work on the public highways or some lease
42
system as in the South.
Meanwhile Minnesota was doing some constructive experimenting of its own. When its law of 1889 made one half of the prisoners
available to contractors an agreement was made with the recently
organized Minnesota Thresher Company to produce its binder twine.
It was a hew thing for a state prison to get in on the ground floor
of an expanding industry with a great market in the community.
Whatever labor problems might have developed were forestalled as
the state took this industry over in the early nineties and established
the model state-account system of the nation. Producing and selling
cheap in an almost unlimited market to the benefit of the chief portion of its electorate, and at the same time paying its prison expenses,
Minnesota had an unassailable system. 3
The non-industrial states of the North largely escaped this problem. Wisconsin gave it no attention until the depression of 1893
caused its contractor, to lay off most of his laborers and roused the
authorities to the danger of. dependence on such a system. An investigation was made and a change to the New York system proposed, but returning prosperity solved the problem, and it was not
until 1907 that a new system was adopted, patterned after Minnesota,
4
'McKelvey, B., "Penology in the Westward Movement" The Pacific Historical
42 Review, December, 1933.
Mo. Gov. Messages, vol. VI. Gov. J. S. Phelps (1881), pp. 85-86: coal
mining started in 1877 and by 1881 it practically paid the expenses of the
prison; pp. 316-22; Gov. T. T. Crittenden reports clear profit of $5000 in 1883.
Kansas State Penitentiary (1880), pp. 6-8: coal shaft started, 1879; (1886),
pp. 3-7: it pays entire expense with income from other industries and board
from United States and New Mexico convicts. West Virginia Penitentiary
(1894/96) : prison reports a surplus over all expenses and contrasts this with
deficits
43 as $100,000 in New Jersey.
American Prison Association, Proceedings (1912), pp. 369-74. The National Prison Association changed its name in 1908 to the American Prison
Association.
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however, rather than New York. 44 In Iowa, aside from the successful action of button companies to secure protection from prison
competition, little attempt was made to regulate the use of prison
labor.45

Except in Massachusetts none of the New England prisons experienced any hardships due to the anti-contract agitation. As they
were able, by virtue of their good discipline, to attract reasonable
bids for their labor, most of them contrived to be fairly self-supporting. The authorities and reformers in Connecticut worried a
good deal over 'the danger of legislation, but none came. Maine,
however, seriously hampered her prison industry, carried on for many
years at state account, by limiting the number to be employed at any
one trade to twenty per cent of the convicts. The sole industry, a
wagon manufacture, was seriously handicapped until the warden hit
upon the trick of dividing the industry into several trades. The
prison, however, never regained its old prosperity, for, symbolical of
most prisons, it was putting its money on the horse in g railroad era.46
New Function of Prison Industry
The controlling factors in the convict labor problem of the nineties
were thus local rather than national in character. Only in such states
as New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, were the interests
sufficiently organized to secure their full desires, and it was fortunate
that these states were able to bear the burdens of non-productive
prisons. The neat penological rationalization of the legislation in
these states attracted both the interests and the reformers throughout
the country; gradually the old American tradition of prisons supported by the labor of their inmates gave place to a new standard of
convicts working to learn trades but avoiding the public markets. If
its negative aspects were most prominent, both in the causes and the
results, the new industrial program nevertheless contributed much
to the spread of the reformatory function of labor.
Organized labor, strong throughout the North in the mideighties, lost much of its political influence after the decline of the
Knights. Whatever its defects for the economic struggle, this national body exerted through its state and district assemblies a powerful
influence on state politicians. It not only claimed to fight the whole
cause of labor, but it was quick in this instance to defend the welfare
44Wisconsin Board of Control, 2nd Report (1893-94)), p. 13; Wisconsin
Prison5 Labor Commission, Report of ....... (1897), pp. 22-27.
4 Briggs, J. E., History of Social Legislation in Iowa (Iovwa City, 1915),
pp. 210-13.
46National Conference Char. and Corr., Proceedings (1893), pp. 170-71.
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47
When its strength declined, this
of a small portion of its members.
plank of its platform was eagerly taken over by the rising Federation
of Labor. The cautious political activity of the subsidiary state
federations prevented this body from attaining the influence of its
predecessor over prison developments. Nevertheless the continued
growth of the power of the national federation, and its unswerving
adherence to the attack on penal servitude, did much to prepare
public opinion and especially the politicians for the new function of
prison industry.-

The Republicans as well as the Democrats began to see the
light towards the end of the century. This became evident in a series
of national investigations. Carroll D. Wright, as Commissioner of
Labor under Cleveland in 1886, had defended the contractor, but by
1896 he had advanced with the times and reported the existence of
unfair competition. The final crystallization of the new standards
appeared in the recommendations of the United States Industrial
Commission of 1900 created by a Republican House. Its report
strongly indorsed New York's recently elaborated state-use system;
in fact twelve out of its thirteen resolutions urged the superiority of
this system over all others. A considerable array of statistics revealed greater profits from the contracts, but the commission took
a higher ground, asserting that "The most desirable system for employing convicts is one which provides primarily for the punishment
and reformation of the prisoners and the least competition with free
49
Both of
labor, and, secondarily, for the revenue of the State."
in the
decline
the
of
complained
than
these reports justified rather
comparathe
earning capacities of the prisons, and they rejoiced in
tive expansion of the public-account industry; in the later of these
investigations even the piece-price system was frowned upon.
47Beckner, Illinois Labor Legislation, p. 138, recounts how a couple hundred coopers of Chicago brought the entire influence of the state labor forces
to their defence.
• Carroll, Labor in Politics. pp. 114-16. Miss Carroll gives a list of the
A. F. of L. resolutions on prison labor:
1881-Convict labor is a "species of slavery"; unfair competition.
1883-Prison products should be so labeled.
1897-Eight hour day, and production for state institutions only.
1899-No convict-made goods to be sold in the open market.
1891-Convicts should receive all earnings after costs.
49House of Representatives Industrial Commission, Prison Labor, 56th
Congress, 1st Session, Doc. 476, part 3, p. 11 and passim. See also, U. S.
Department of Labor, Special Bulletin No. 5 of .....on Contract Labor
(1896), p. 446 and passim; p. 446: The total income in forty-one states in
1885 had been $24,271,078 and this fell to such an extent that they reported
only $19,042,472 in 1895, while at the same time the number of convicts increased from 41,877 to 54,244 between these dates. The problem of comparison
is complicated because the sum is the value of the goods, not of the work.
U. S. Com. of Labor, "Convict Labor," Report for 1905.
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The new theories did not always have clear sailing. These national reports showed an irresponsibility for state budgets that stood
in sharp contrast with several state investigations. An Illinois commission, originally favorable to the New York plan, was frightened
from it by a discovery of the failure of even the well organized administrative agencies of that state to secure employment for more
than one-third of the state prisoners and for few of those in the
counties; it was especially cautioned by the discouraging financial
results.50 Nevertheless the day of self-supporting prisons was passing, and the states were at the same time becoming accustomed to
larger budgets. The recommendations of the Industrial Commission
were to be widely quoted in following years.
The one resolution of this Commission which proposed definite
action by Congress revived the old agitation for the restraint of
inter-state traffic in prison made goods. The old O'Neill bill has
been repeatedly agitated, but it had always been tabled. Several of
the states had undertaken to secure the same end by laws regulating
the importation of prison products from other states, requiring branding or an importer's license, or some such restraint. 51 Congress itself
forbade the importation of such goods from foreign countries. But
the state laws were being attacked in the courts, and already the more
extreme New York and Ohio laws had been set aside. 2 The problem
had a clear affinity with the regulation of the inter-state liquor traffic;
the Industrial Commission favored a Wilson Act for prison labor instead of the complete federal prohibition of such commerce proposed
by the O'Neill bill.6 3 Three decades were to pass before Congress
passed the Hawes-Cooper Bill, which was in effect a response to
this earlier recommendation.
The prison labor problem had arrived at the zenith of its influence by the close of the century. While the aggressive activity of
organized labor had turned to the economic field, politicians eager to
attract votes still campaigned, and competing industrial interests were
gaining a hearing. Only a few of the states had carried their legislation far enough to gain political stability, but already their measures were the center of agitation in many of the other states. Even
BOBeckner, History of Labor Legislation in Ill., pp. 142-43.
-'House Indus. Com., op. cit., pp. 141-66, a complete summary of convict
labor laws. New York and Ohio were the first in 1894, but Kentucky, Indiana,
and Wisconsin followed in rapid succession, and Colorado shortly adopted a
moderate law.
52Ohio law set aside in Arnold v. Yanders (1897), 47 N. E. Reports, p. 50;
and 53
New York law in People v.'Hawkins (1898) 51 N. E. Reports, p. 257.
House Indus. Com., op. cit., pp. 15-16. The state decisions followed the
reasoning of Leslie v. Hardin (1889), 125 U. S., pp. 100 ff. which had determined Congress to pass the Wilson Act to help the states carry out their
liquor policies. The analogy was close.
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the federal government had mounted the band wagon and was considering taking the driver's seat with a questionable federal police
power.
The larger significance of the problem was just beginning to
appear. Most of the states, escaping the rigors of the agitation, had
been able by one means or another to provide employment for the
large majority of their convicts, and, in spite of brief crises, the old
system had been able to hold its own in their prisons. In Pennsylvania, New York, and to a lesser degree in Massachusetts, a new
situation had developed; the major reliance of the disciplinarians
could no longer be a good day's hard labor. This was fortunate for
the reformatories; they were encouraged to develop to the full their
trade schools, their military organizations, and all of the other features of their discipline which, in an earlier era, they might have
abandoned as needs for economy urged self-support. The regular
prisons in these states were in a quandary. The labor system in
Pennsylvania had become a farce; in New York the lax administration supplied scarcely one-third of the convicts with work; in Massachusetts the prisoners were idling about antiquated machinery, and
no officer pretended to maintain the old silent system. 54 Should the
prisons adopt the reformatory methods and strive- to provide a constructive associate life; should they study to provide conditions that
would keep the convicts fairly contented and orderly; could they
maintain obedience in the face of idleness by a return to brutal punishments-these were some of the questions that labor legislation was
forcing on the attention of the authorities in 1900.
And today the states that escaped the issue when it was raised
three decades ago, providing they have not solved its dilemma during
the interim, will face it finally under the Hawes-Cooper Act. Our
century has seen the successful application of two additional labor
alternatives, the honor road camp, and the minimum* security farm,
but no state that has excluded its products from the public market
can point to a satisfactory industrial activity in its prisons. The
effect has been (and will continue to be) an encouragement to the
development of convict activities of a reformatory character, ether
vocational or recreational-except in those prisons where the convicts have been surrendered to a desultory idleness.
54
- Klein, New York Prisons, pp. 272-73: "Since that date (1896) there has
been more idleness in state prisons and county penitentiaries than was known
On
throughout the whole previous history of prison labor . . . (formerly)
the whole, however, contract labor and other similar forms, including the
piece-price system, have been fairly well able to supply the necessary amount
of labor. By comparison, the state-use system in vogue since 1897 has been
a failure."

